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The Third Way 
Kent Greenfield* 
INTRODUCTION 
In this Article, I have both a descriptive and a normative claim 
about corporate governance. As a descriptive matter, I believe that we in 
the United States and, indeed, perhaps worldwide, find ourselves in an 
unusual and potentially pivotal moment in the intellectual history of cor-
porate law theory and doctrine. As a normative matter, I believe we 
should use this moment to adjust corporate governance so as to situate 
corporations more dynamically within a broader social, political, and 
economic context. 
The descriptive claim is based on a judgment, shared by some oth-
ers, that there is more openness to revisiting the core questions about 
what corporations are, to whom they owe obligations, and how best to 
conceptualize them and their regulation than at any time in a generation. 
This moment has been engendered because of the increasing skepticism 
the public is showing toward corporations and the people who manage 
them. The skepticism springs from shocks in the economic and political 
fields that revealed the risks of unbridled corporate power, short-
termism, managerial opportunism, and shareholder (read Wall Street) 
supremacy. 
To paraphrase Rahm Emanuel, one never wants such a moment to 
go to waste.1 The question, of course, is what to do with such an oppor-
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 1. Speaking of the Global Financial Crisis, Rahm Emanuel said that “you never want a serious 
crisis to go to waste. And what I mean by that is an opportunity to do things that you think you could 
not do before.” WSJDigitalNetwork, Rahm Emanuel on the Opportunities of Crisis, YOUTUBE (Nov. 
19, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_mzcbXi1Tkk. 
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tunity to question, rethink, and re-conceptualize some first principles in 
the field. 
One obstacle to taking advantage of this moment is the failure of 
academic analysis to break out of the conceptual dichotomy that has long 
dominated these debates within corporate law. The typical debate has 
been between shareholder supremacists and managerialists. All too often, 
moments of ferment in the field have brought about merely a swing of 
the pendulum from one of these paradigms toward the other.2 
Shareholder supremacists lament the instances of managerial mis-
management and self-dealing, and offer a remedy of increased share-
holder power.3 If only management were constrained, they argue, by ad-
ditional shareholder power to nominate directors, approve executive pay, 
or receive financial disclosures, then management’s incentives would 
better align with shareholder interests. The downside of this remedy is 
that many of the risks of corporate power would increase with increased 
shareholder say. Shareholder empowerment would hardly resolve the 
problems of short-termism, environmental degradation, employee mis-
treatment and disempowerment, and risk externalization. In fact, the op-
posite would likely be true. This is because the interests of shareholders 
at best align only haphazardly with the interests of other stakeholders and 
of society as a whole, and at worst align not at all.4 
Meanwhile, the managerial and directorial apologists suggest that 
the way forward is to protect managerial prerogative.5 The goal is to em-
power the benevolent corporate elites to resist the shortsighted urges of 
the marketplace and manage the firm for the long-term benefit of its in-
vestors and perhaps even society as a whole. If only management would 
                                                 
 2. While labeled differently, these two paradigms map fairly closely to the two schools of 
thought identified and analyzed in David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, ___ ST. THOMAS L. 
REV. ___ (forthcoming). Millon labels the two schools “radical shareholder primacy” and the man-
ager-protective “traditional model.” Both, as he points out, ultimately are aimed at shareholder bene-
fit, though the former is more skeptical of managerial agency, and the latter is more permissive of it. 
 3. The leading voice of the shareholder supremacists is probably Lucian Bebchuck. See Lucian 
Ayre Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005). He is 
not alone of course. For other examples, see Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Take-
over Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 521, 522 (2002); Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2000); 
Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 
COLUM. L. REV. 795 (1993). 
 4. See Kent Greenfield, Defending Stakeholder Governance, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1043, 
1055–59 (2008). 
 5. The most prominent of these scholars is probably Stephen Bainbridge. See Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 
547 (2003); see also Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-
Laws: Taking Back the Street?, 73 TUL. L. REV. 409 (1998); Jonathan R. Macey, The Legality and 
Utility of the Shareholder Rights Bylaw, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 835, 837 (1998). 
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be loosened from the bothersome constraints of shareholder activism and 
government regulation, we would witness a burst of competitive energy 
that would carry us toward economic nirvana. The downside of this rem-
edy is that managerial prerogative is, as a descriptive matter, overwhelm-
ingly used to benefit managers. Explosions in executive compensation 
and perquisites, the manipulation of financial reporting and disclosure, 
and self-dealing in various guises are a more common outcome than be-
nevolence. If the treatment for the ills of shareholder primacy is manage-
rial empowerment, the cure may be worse than the disease. 
There is a third way, and my normative claim is that we should use 
this moment to consider it. Managerial obligation could be increased 
without the obligation running solely to the holders of equity. Fiduciaries 
of companies could be subject to meaningful constraints and obligations, 
enforceable by courts, without disabling their ability to use the corporate 
form for economic gain. The conceptual innovation of this third way—I 
use “innovation,” though the idea is actually quite ancient—is for the 
fiduciary obligations of management to run to the firm as a whole, which 
would include an obligation to take into account the interests of all those 
who make material investments in the firm. Within this framework, it 
would continue to be a violation of fiduciary duties for management to 
self-deal, act carelessly, or exercise something less than good faith judg-
ment. It would also be a violation of their duties to prioritize one stake-
holder over others consistently and persistently or to fail to consider the 
interests of all stakeholders in significant corporate decisions. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. First, I situate the current mo-
ment of intellectual churning in corporate law in a larger historical narra-
tive and explain why we find ourselves in this moment now. Second, I 
suggest what a third way might require in terms of conceptualization, 
process, and substance of corporate governance. Third, I propose some 
affirmative benefits we could achieve with these changes. Lastly, I an-
swer a few of the principal objections to such a conceptual and regulato-
ry shift. 
I. A MOMENT OF INTELLECTUAL CHURNING 
The intellectual history of corporate law, of course, must be under-
stood in broader historical and legal trends. Not surprisingly, the law of 
business reflects social understandings and presumptions about both 
business and law. 
A. A Look Back 
A century ago, federal courts in the United States protected busi-
nesses from regulatory mandates and limits by use of a broad Due Pro-
752 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 37:749 
cess Clause and a narrow Commerce Clause.6 The most emblematic con-
stitutional case of the time, Lochner v. New York, in which the Supreme 
Court struck down New York’s attempt to limit the hours that bakers 
would be forced to work by their employers, gave its name to the juris-
prudential era. Meanwhile, the corporate law doctrine reflected a similar 
emphasis. The most famous corporate law case of the era, Dodge v. Ford 
Motor Company, announced that “[a] business corporation is organized 
and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”7 Though this 
was a statement articulated only by a court in one state, it encapsulated 
the zeitgeist of the Gilded era ideals of private property and the judici-
ary’s willingness to protect them aggressively. The courts saw the com-
panies as the private property of shareholders and were willing to protect 
them from legislative encroachments with constitutional tools and from 
managerial encroachments with corporate law tools. 
The Great Depression amounted to an intellectual turning point, as 
the economic upheaval caused people to re-conceptualize the market it-
self as a creature of the state rather than existing in a state of nature.8 A 
part of this shift was a fundamental rethinking of the role of business 
corporations, the nature of their ownership, and of their obligations to 
broader society.9 The ramifications of this re-conceptualization were 
immense, with the most profound changes for business coming in the 
form of the great Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934,10 the labor protec-
                                                 
 6. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 
(1936). 
 7. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
 8. See CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 20 (1990) (“For the New Deal re-
formers . . . the common law was hardly neutral or pre-political, but instead reflected a set of explicit 
regulatory decisions.”); The intellectual leaders of the legal realist movement are owed credit for this 
insight. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 
COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935); Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-
Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923). 
 9. ADOLF A. BERLE JR. AND GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (1932). Berle and Means, of course, pointed out that there had been a separation of the 
firm’s “ownership” from its “control.” Contrary to many descriptions of their work, however, they 
did not believe that the remedy for such separation was necessarily increased shareholder power. 
Instead, they urged that managers be required to use their greater independence from shareholders to 
take into account broader social concerns. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Talking with My Friends: A 
Response to a Dialogue on Corporate Irresponsibility, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 988, 989 (2002) 
(stating that Berle’s theory of corporate governance required strict regulations channeling manageri-
al efforts “to the benefit of the stockholders, thus allowing for the confident investment and the 
healthy economy that would bring us out of the Depression and ultimately benefit everyone”); see 
also David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201 (1990); Dalia Tsuk, From 
Pluralism to Individualism: Berle and Means and 20th-Century American Legal Thought, 30 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 179 (2005). 
 10. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 1–26, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77bbbb (2006); Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, §§ 1–37, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78nn (2006). 
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tions in the National Labor Relations Act of 193511 (protecting the right 
to bargain collectively), and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 193812 (cre-
ating a federal minimum wage). 
We again saw a burst of interest in the fundamental questions of the 
nature of corporations from the 1960s through the 1970s as a part of a 
broader social critique on the status quo that also included the civil rights 
and anti-war movements. Environmental scholars such as Rachel Car-
son13 and consumer activists such as Ralph Nader14 raised awareness of 
how the political influence, unsustainable practices, and global reach of 
corporations posed dangers to society. In response, environmental law, 
anti-discrimination law, anti-corruption law, and consumer protection 
law were all strengthened on the regulatory side.15 On the corporate side, 
we saw the rise of the so-called stakeholder statutes, which claimed to 
protect the ability of company management to look after the interests of 
companies’ non-shareholder constituents.16 Among academics, we saw 
an increasing skepticism about Delaware’s status as the preeminent and 
predominant provider of corporate governance law in the United States.17 
Thereafter, we saw a significant pushback—even retrenchment—in 
politics, law, and academia. The “Reagan Revolution” was about more 
than merely who won the White House in 1980 and 1984. More broadly, 
it engendered an attack on regulation generally and fostered a belief in 
and a presumption in favor of the market. In the legal academy in the 
United States, we saw the rise of the “law and economics” movement, 
whose scholars applied a simplistic version of neoclassical economic 
thought to law, arguing that individuals are rational maximizers of utility 
and act with free will.18 These scholars argued that the grand purpose of 
law is to allow people to satisfy their preferences, primarily by empower-
ing private agreements and otherwise standing aside. 
The law and economics scholars gained particular purchase in the 
corporate law field. The corporation was re-conceptualized as a nexus of 
                                                 
 11. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (Supp. 1937). 
 12. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (1982). 
 13. See RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962). 
 14. See RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED (1965); RALPH NADER, JOEL SELIGMAN & 
MARK GREEN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976). 
 15. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE 
REGULATORY STATE (1993). 
 16. See Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 24 (1992); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework 
for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 592–94 (1992). 
 17. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 
YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974). 
 18. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (6th ed. 2003) (“[M]an is a rational 
maximizer of his ends in life.”). 
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contracts, with the law needing only to establish presumably efficient 
default rules that the parties could otherwise negotiate around.19 Law and 
economic scholars saw corporate law as emphatically private law.20 Cor-
porate law should thus provide “off-the-rack” rules that were primarily 
enabling rather than prescriptive and that could be easily contracted 
around. Law should not dictate the details of the obligations among the 
parties because each party—including each of the various stakeholders of 
the firm—is assumed to know her own interests and to protect them best 
through bargaining and exchange. If the parties disliked the terms of the 
“contract” between themselves and the company, they could leave. Not 
only could shareholders sell their shares, but employees could quit, man-
agers could find a different company to manage, suppliers could sell their 
goods elsewhere, and creditors could sell their bonds.21 
This academic re-conceptualization went hand-in-hand with a shift 
in emphasis among management. Duties to the company ceased to be 
seen as or enforced as a function of legal or moral obligation. Duties to 
the company were simply a function of the market.22 Thus, the obligation 
of management began to be seen as maximization of share value, and the 
law—for the most part—stepped aside in enforcing fiduciary duties ex-
cept in those cases where managerial self-interest polluted their obliga-
tion to maximize share price. Corporate health was equated with share 
price or, actually, the positive movement of share price from quarter to 
quarter, then month to month, then day to day, then nanosecond to nano-
second. 
These trends revealed themselves in various ways over time. The 
1980s saw a fixation on leveraged buy-outs and hostile takeovers, driven 
more by the uber-competitive personalities of celebrity CEOs than by 
corporate need or economies of scale. (“Winners” in the takeover battles 
                                                 
 19. See Kent Greenfield, The End of Contractarianism? Behavioral Economics and the Law of 
Corporations, in HANDBOOK ON BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Eyal Zamir & Doron 
Teichman eds., forthcoming 2014). The foundational texts of this contractarian view are Michael C. 
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Own-
ership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) and FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, 
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991). 
 20. KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND 
PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 29–39 (2006). See Daniel Fischel, The Corporate Governance Move-
ment, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1273–74 (“Because the corporation is a particular type of firm formed 
by individuals acting voluntarily and for their mutual benefit, it can far more reasonably be viewed 
as the product of private contract than as a creature of the state.”). 
 21. See generally Jonathan Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Mak-
ing Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON 
L. REV. 23 (1991). 
 22. See Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. Rev. 595 
(1997). 
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mostly lost over time.23) In the 1990s, we saw an explosion of manageri-
al compensation, most famously at Disney, where president Michael 
Ovitz was paid $130 million to accept his firing after one ego-puncturing 
year in that role.24 Charity stopped being seen as something done for the 
public and instead a boon for management—a way to compensate elite 
managers by funding their pet projects and the like. (The best example 
was The Armand Hammer museum in Los Angeles, an iconic tribute to 
the ego of Occidental Petroleum’s CEO, funded by Occidental Petrole-
um.25) 
In the 2000s, as corporate leaders came to see themselves less as 
managers and more as financiers, those holding stock came to see them-
selves less as owners and more as investors, even speculators. Institu-
tional investors owned most stocks in the United States, and most shares 
changed hands at least once a year. By 2008, in fact, stocks turned over 
four times a year.26 The financial elite derived a host of new products, 
and the market came to depend more and more on derivative markets. 
The upside of betting on the markets became huge; the richest people in 
town were not the celebrity CEOs but the celebrity managers of hedge 
funds and private equity funds.27 They made money because they max-
imized their income by way of leverage. But the risk—we now know in 
hindsight—was largely externalized to and borne by the economy as a 
whole, especially by those who owned the underlying physical assets on 
which the financial elite were betting, derivatively. Meanwhile, corporate 
executives were driven by this new market frenzy to care more and more 
about the short-term.28 
Meanwhile, the dedication of the professional managerial class to 
their company’s employees and communities—something that Berle and 
Means had urged onto management decades before, and which had in 
fact characterized a material portion of the economy during the middle of 
the century—decayed. Real wages stagnated or fell; job security erod-
                                                 
 23. Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. BUS. 197 (1986); 
James Fanto, Quasi-Rationality in Action: A Study Of Psychological Factors in Merger Decision-
Making, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1333 (2001). 
 24. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 35 (Del. 2006). 
 25. See Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 54–55 (Del. 1991). 
 26. Stocks Traded, Turnover Ratio (%), WORLD BANK, http://data.world 
bank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.TRNR?order=wbapi_data_value_2008+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data
_value-first&sort=desc (last visited Sept. 27, 2013). 
 27. Hedge Fund Salaries, CAREERS-IN-FIN., http://www.careers-in-finance.com/hfsal.htm (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2013). 
 28. See Kent Greenfield, The Puzzle of Short-Termism, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627 (2011). 
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ed.29 Unions lost power; private rates of union membership in the United 
States fell to their historical nadir.30 As companies became more interna-
tional, and certainly as finance became global, workers’ wages became 
depressed and nations found it more difficult to maintain national regula-
tory boundaries. 
This period of roughly thirty years, from the 1980s through the first 
decade of the 2000s, saw the triumph of “contractarianism,” which I use 
simply as shorthand for the concurrence of three phenomena: first, in 
boardrooms—a fixation on share price; second, in politics—a push for 
deregulation (sometimes called self-regulation), especially of financial 
markets; and third, in law and legal theory—a dependence on the notion 
of contract as the conceptual centerpiece rather than fiduciary duty. 
While there were always dissenters within the corporate law academy,31 
contractarianism was certainly dominant during this period. 
B. The Current Moment 
The dominance of contractarianism was the state of play in the ear-
ly years of the twenty-first century. But the last decade has seen its de-
cline. In the academy, the lead author of its decline has been behavioral 
economics, which questions the so-called rational actor assumptions of 
neoclassical economics. Behavioral economics began to be taken seri-
ously in the legal academy in the last decade of the twentieth century,32 
beginning to gain traction in corporate law scholarship by the early 
2000s.33 By 2011, one of the leading legal behavioralists could claim that 
“the battle to separate the economic analysis of legal rules and institu-
                                                 
 29. For a review of the pertinent economic statistics at the end of the Twentieth Century, see 
Kent Greenfield, There’s a Forest in Those Trees: Teaching About the Role of Corporations in Soci-
ety, 34 GA. L. REV. 1011 (2000). 
 30. The best source for United States statistics to substantiate these claims is The Economic 
Policy Institute, available at www.epi.org, particularly their annual book-length reports entitled The 
State of Working America. 
 31. For a good review, see David K. Millon, New Directions in Corporate Law: Communitari-
ans, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373 (1993). For 
book-length treatments, see LAWRENCE MITCHELL, PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (1995) and 
GREENFIELD, supra note 20. 
 32. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment 
and Decisionmaking in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998); 
Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality 
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051. (2000). 
 33. Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations 
Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101 (1997); 
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of 
Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001); Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to 
Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate Law As Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 581 
(2002). 
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tions from the straightjacket of strict rational choice assumptions has 
been won.”34 
The implications of the strength of behavioral economics are im-
mense. It meant that, if the political and economic situation allowed for a 
broader challenge, the intellectual basis for challenging contractarian 
assumptions in corporate law (and indeed law generally) had been estab-
lished. 
The Global Financial Crisis of 2007–08 (GFC) provided that con-
text and finally marked the end of the glory days of homo economicus. 
The collapse pulled back the curtain, revealing the Great Oz of the ra-
tional market behind the curtain to be a fraud, along with its subsidiary 
dependence on the rational actor model.35 If a stalwart of the rationality 
school, such as former Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Alan 
Greenspan, was forced to admit that he had “found a flaw” in his theory 
of the free market, then few absolutists were left indeed.36 
A few months after the GFC, another shock in the United States 
came in the form of the Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission,37 which validated the constitutional rights 
of corporations to engage in political discourse and to spend money from 
general treasury funds to influence electoral outcomes. Federal and state 
laws limiting the political spending of corporations—laws that had been 
on the books in some instances for a century—were struck down.38 As a 
result, we saw a massive inflow of money into the mid-term elections in 
2010 and then again in 2012, mostly by way of “Super-PACs,” corporate 
entities organized for the purpose of collecting and spending the money 
                                                 
 34. Russell Korobkin, What Comes After Victory for Behavioral Law and Economics?, 2011 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1653, 1655 (2011). 
 35. See id. (“[T]he battle to separate the economic analysis of legal rules and institutions from 
the straightjacket of strict rational choice assumptions has been won.”). 
 36. Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/business/economy/24panel.html?_r=0. 
 37. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 38. Id. at 395 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s approach to corporate electioneering 
marks a dramatic break from our past. Congress has placed special limitations on campaign spending 
by corporations ever since the passage of the Tillman Act in 1907.”). The Tillman Act, originally 
enacted in 1907, prohibited corporations and national banks from contributing money to federal 
campaigns. Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864, 864–65 (1907) (codified as amended at 2 
U.S.C. § 441b (2006)). The Federal Corrupt Practices Act, originally enacted in 1910, extended 
federal regulation of campaign contributions and expenditures in federal elections. 43 Stat. 1070, 2 
U.S.C. §§ 241–256. For an example of the Citizens United decision effectively striking down state 
laws limiting the political spending of corporations, see Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 
S.Ct. 2490 (2012) (striking down a Montana Supreme Court decision to uphold the state’s campaign 
finance laws since the legal issue had already been precluded by Citizens United). 
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of very rich individuals. So-called “independent expenditures” exploded 
by a factor of 10, from less than $100 million to over $1 billion.39 
Within the Court’s reasoning was embedded a law-and-economics 
view of corporations as a private entity, rightly insulated from the con-
straints of public regulation of their political influence. Previously, the 
Court and commentators had given credence to an argument that corpo-
rations should be limited in their political activities to protect sharehold-
ers from having their resources used by management to further views 
inconsistent with those of shareholders.40 But in Citizens United, the 
Court argued that shareholders could protect themselves through the 
normal mechanisms of corporate governance.41 This was simply a con-
ventional application of contractarianism. The needs of shareholders 
need not be considered within the First Amendment calculus because 
their involvement in corporations is voluntary, and they have the power 
to protect themselves from any encroachment of their interests. What 
was remarkable about Citizens United was that it used these contractarian 
notions found in mainstream corporate law in service of an effort to ex-
pand corporate prerogatives in constitutional law. 
One might argue that Citizens United, in expanding contractarian 
notions beyond corporate law and using them as a foundational principle 
                                                 
 39. See, e.g., McConnell v Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 204 (2003) (discussing the pre-
Citizens United requirement that corporations speak through PACs, saying that such requirement 
“allows corporate political participation without the temptation to use corporate funds for political 
influence, quite possibly at odds with the sentiments of some shareholders or members”); Citizens 
United, 558 U.S. at 476 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the restrictions on corporate independ-
ent expenditures “curbs the rent seeking behavior of executives and respects the views of dissenters” 
(citing Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), to argue that a crucial rea-
son for maintaining integrity of the electoral process is to protect shareholders from coerced 
speech)); Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 133, 201 (1998) (arguing that a 
restriction on corporate expenditures “simply allows people who have invested in the business cor-
poration for purely economic reasons to avoid being taken advantage of, without sacrificing their 
economic objectives”). 
 40. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 204 (discussing the pre-Citizens United requirement that 
corporations speak through PACs, saying that such requirement “allows corporate political participa-
tion without the temptation to use corporate funds for political influence, quite possibly at odds with 
the sentiments of some shareholders or members . . . .” (citing Fed. Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 
539 U.S. 146, 194–95 (2003)); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 476 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
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in expanding corporate constitutional rights, amounted to the capstone of 
the contractarian triumph. But I believe the exact opposite view is more 
persuasive. The response to the opinion was massive and almost univer-
sally negative. Soon after the decision, as many as 80% of Americans 
thought it was a mistake,42 and President Obama faced down members of 
the Court at the State of the Union, accusing them of judicial activism.43 
In the almost four years since the decision, opposition to the decision has 
remained steady, and a movement to amend the Constitution to overturn 
the decision is gaining serious traction. At this writing, fifteen states, 
more than 500 localities, 27 U.S. senators, over 100 U.S. representatives, 
and the President have endorsed an amendment of some kind.44 In fact, a 
petition to the Securities and Exchange Commission to require public 
corporations to disclose to shareholders their political spending received 
over 500,000 comments.45 
So for our purposes, it is not the Citizens United decision that is 
key. Rather, the fact that it has engendered such a political backlash re-
veals much about the public’s fear of corporate power and, implicitly, its 
skepticism of the contractarian notions driving the opinion. Occurring so 
soon after the GFC, Citizens United impressed onto the United States 
public that the misuse of corporate power posed significant risks not only 
to the economy but to democracy as well. 
In my view, these shocks have engendered a new openness to re-
thinking the conventional notions of corporate law and governance and 
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of corporations more generally. An article in the Harvard Business Re-
view recently proclaimed,  
There’s a growing body of evidence . . . that the companies that are 
most successful at maximizing shareholder value over time are 
those that aim toward goals other than maximizing shareholder val-
ue. Employees and customers often know more about and have 
more of a long-term commitment to a company than shareholders 
do.46 
A popular, non-business essayist in the New York Times wrote that “it 
feels as if we are at the dawn of a new movement—one aimed at over-
turning the hegemony of shareholder value.”47 The Washington Post 
sympathetically covered an essay48 that I wrote, in a progressive policy 
journal, calling for reform.49 
My normative claim is that we should take advantage of this mo-
ment of skepticism of the status quo and of openness to new frameworks. 
The devil, of course, is in answering how we do that. 
II. IDEAS FOR CHANGE 
Often, the battle within corporate law has been between manageri-
alists and shareholder supremacists. Efforts to protect the other stake-
holders of the corporation have been left to the “external” regulation of 
antitrust law, environmental law, labor law, and the like. But these ef-
forts have mostly been of the “command-and-control” type, working like 
a fleet of tugboats to pull the corporate tanker ship away from what 
would otherwise be their natural course.50 
My argument is simply that we should consider a new kind of regu-
latory effort—actually, an old one if truth be told—building a public in-
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terest element into corporate governance itself, creating the possibility 
that businesses become a more positive social force on their own. I am 
not urging that corporations become altruistic or charitable institutions. 
The best way for corporations to serve the public interest is to create 
wealth, primarily by selling worthwhile goods and services for a profit.51 
What I do suggest is that we should define wealth broadly and require 
corporations to focus on creating it with both a greater awareness of the 
costs inherent in its creation and the benefits that flow from broadly dis-
tributing it. If we can create the initiative within large corporations to 
head in the correct direction on their own, we will need fewer tugboats to 
correct their course later. 
A. The Conceptual Shift 
What specific reforms are needed? The most crucial one, I believe, 
is conceptual rather than legal or political. We should cease thinking of 
corporations as pieces of property owned by shareholders, whose owner-
ship in any event is recognized only in the breach. Instead, we should 
conceptualize businesses as team-like collective economic enterprises 
making use of a multitude of inputs from various kinds of investors. As I 
have said elsewhere, “Corporations are collective enterprises, drawing on 
investments from various stakeholders who contribute to the firm’s suc-
cess.”52 The success of corporations depends on the contributions of 
many different stakeholders, and the governance of corporations should 
recognize those contributions. Fixating on the contributions of only one 
of these groups—shareholders—blinds us to the essential investments of 
the others and encourages management to prioritize shareholder interest 
alone. But for a business to succeed, people and institutions must invest 
financial capital; other people must invest labor, intelligence, skill, and 
attention; and local communities must invest infrastructure of various 
kinds. 
None of these investors makes its contribution out of altruism or 
obligation. What they are doing is contributing in hopes of potential gain 
if things go well. They expect management to gather inputs from other 
contributors, put them together in a way that will enable the company to 
produce goods or services for a profit, and then distribute the wealth that 
is created. The benefits can come in various forms—goods and services 
for consumers, jobs for employees, tax bases for communities, financial 
returns for investors. Each of the contributors has a stake in the company, 
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and the company depends on the contributions of each stakeholder. Un-
fortunately, in our current regulatory scheme in the United States, the 
concerns of the other stakeholders are not considered within the internal, 
structural machinery of corporate governance. These stakeholders are to 
be taken care of, to the extent they are at all, by way of protections they 
can gain through contract or external regulation. 
Compare this to the U.K. model of corporate governance, which at 
least recognizes the obligations to consider these interests, and the Euro-
pean model, which requires much more robust social obligation on the 
part of corporations embodied both in cultural norms and law.53 Under 
the European model, the duty to disclose information and consult with 
employees is much more robust, and many large European companies 
include labor representatives on their boards. These efforts to include 
employees in company governance are intended to embody norms of 
workplace democracy and economic fairness. But they are also seen as 
an important component of economic success, and indeed, Germany—
where co-determination is strongest—is now the economic powerhouse 
of Europe. The CEO of the German company Siemens argues that code-
termination is a “comparative advantage” for Germany;54 the senior 
managing director of the U.S. investment firm Blackstone Group has said 
board-level employee representation was one of the factors that allowed 
Germany to avoid the worst of the financial crisis.55 
B. Specific Regulatory Changes 
Once we escape the conceptual stranglehold of shareholder-as-
owner, then we can ask the kind of robust questions that go to the heart 
of the matter, most crucially: How can we create, empower, and regulate 
business entities so that they are most likely to create wealth, broadly 
defined and distributed, while minimizing their harms both immediate 
and latent? There are a wide range of possible answers to this question, 
but allow me to propose a few specific regulatory changes for corporate 
law and governance that would fit within this framework. 
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First, the law of corporate governance should expand the fiduciary 
duties of management to include an obligation to consider the interests of 
all stakeholders in the firm. For decades, the fiduciary obligations of 
management have been categorized as including a duty of care and a du-
ty of loyalty. Under current judicial interpretation in the United States, 
both mean something less than one might assume—“care” has essentially 
become the duty to gather information and avoid gross negligence; “loy-
alty” has devolved into a mere ban on undisclosed self-dealing, such as 
managers doing special deals with the company on the side. 
While it wouldn’t hurt if both of these duties were more robust with 
regard to shareholders, what I’m suggesting here is that they run to all 
the stakeholders of the company, not just shareholders. With regard to 
the duty of care, this would mean that when senior management or the 
board makes decisions on the strategic course of the company, they 
would need to gather and consider information on the effects of the deci-
sion on the company’s stakeholders. They would not be able to meet 
their obligation simply by evaluating the impact of the decision on the 
company balance sheet but by assessing the long-term impact of the de-
cision on the company as a whole, including its implications for employ-
ees, consumers, and other stakeholders. As to the duty of loyalty, little 
would change except to whom the duty would run, meaning there would 
be a greater number of people interested in monitoring the possible mal-
feasance of management. And, by the way, if a broader duty also meant 
that the duties were more seriously enforced, the shareholders, too, 
would be happier. 
Admittedly, this change would be more in terms of process than in 
required results. But process matters, especially when we are talking 
about the choices of some of the most powerful group decision makers in 
the world. At the very least, corporate directors (and the executives who 
putatively report to them) would not be able to make decisions in which 
the only metric that matters is stock price, measured day-to-day, or even 
quarter-by-quarter. 
Besides, this broader fiduciary duty would benefit the company 
over time. Fiduciary obligations build trust in those who contribute be-
cause they know management has a duty to look after their interests. If 
management owes obligations of care and loyalty to all the firm’s im-
portant stakeholders, they are both more likely to invest in the first place 
and more likely to leave their investment in place over time. This has 
long been thought to be true of shareholders, but it is true for other kinds 
of “investors” as well. For example, employees who do not fear that their 
interests will be shoved aside any time they are in conflict with short-
term profitability will be more loyal and more willing to develop firm-
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specific skills that benefit the company over time, and they will take less 
of an us-versus-them attitude toward management.56 
The second specific regulatory change I propose would be to 
change the actual structure of company boards to allow for the nomina-
tion and election of board members who embody or can credibly speak 
for the interests of stakeholders.57 Currently, the board of U.S. companies 
embodies the interests of two groups: senior management and large 
shareholders. Once we recognize that a variety of stakeholders make es-
sential contributions to the firm, we must face the reality that the current 
structure does not serve most of those stakeholders well. The way to 
change this is to require boards to reflect a broader cross section of those 
who contribute to their companies’ success. 
How to do this? Figuring out which stakeholders deserve represen-
tation and how much they deserve would undoubtedly be tricky. But it 
need not be impossible. Employee representatives would be fairly 
straightforward to elect—either we could use the German model, in 
which employee representatives are selected by the company workforce, 
or we could simply issue each employee one share of a special class of 
stock and have a number of board seats elected by that class. If we want-
ed other stakeholders represented, there are various ways it could be 
done. Community leaders in the localities where the company has a ma-
jor presence could nominate a director; long-term business partners and 
creditors could be represented as well. We could even draw on the Dutch 
experience and require companies to include a “public interest director,” 
whose special obligation would be to vet company decisions from the 
standpoint of the public.58 
III. BENEFITS OF CHANGE 
As scholars, we should remind ourselves that the mere fact that 
change is possible does not mean that change is worthwhile. So allow me 
to articulate three reasons why the changes I am proposing would be 
worth the political and legal effort.  
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A. An Effective Tool Against Inequality 
One reason to support these changes is that they could provide gen-
uine benefits to a range of people, in a way that is relatively efficient as a 
matter of regulatory policy. For example, in the United States, the prob-
lems of wealth and income inequality are at historically high levels. The 
causes of inequality vary, but they spring in part from the behavior of 
corporations—low wages for the working-class, exorbitant compensation 
for corporate executives, and a disproportionate amount of shareholder 
gains going to the richest among us. 
The policy tools that are available to address such inequality are in-
complete at best. We can advocate for an increase in the minimum wage, 
but the benefits diminish above the lowest rungs of the economic ladder. 
We can seek to empower labor unions, but in the United States less than 
7% of the nation’s private work force is organized.59 We can redistribute 
financial wealth from the rich by way of the tax system, but that creates 
resentment even among those who would benefit and arguably decreases 
the incentives to produce in the first place. 
In comparison, changes in corporate fiduciary duties and the 
makeup of the board would mean that the allocation of the financial sur-
plus created by successful corporations is likely to be fairer to all con-
cerned. Because the allocation of corporate surplus is one of the most 
important decisions for boards and senior management, a change in their 
duties and their composition is bound to make a difference. Moreover, 
executives presently receive the compensation they do in part because 
directors and executives are members of what amounts to a private club 
of financial elites, all of whom look after one another. Adding fiduciary 
duties to interests outside the group will diminish this tendency, and the 
inclusion of employee representatives and other stakeholder advocates at 
the board level will make such “insiderism” transparent and less perva-
sive. 
This improvement in the initial allocation of wealth is bound to be 
more efficient in lessening inequality than having government redistrib-
ute wealth after the fact. Fairness in the initial distribution will cause less 
resentment than post hoc redistribution using the tax system. Further, 
employees receiving a fair wage will reciprocate good will toward their 
employers, increasing productivity and decreasing the need for strict 
monitoring. These effects do not exist with a regimen of government re-
distribution. In comparison to increases in the minimum wage, a stake-
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holder-oriented corporate governance system would benefit stakeholders 
up and down the economic hierarchy and earlier in the wealth creation 
process. 
B. Better Decision Making Through Pluralism 
The benefit of requiring corporations to take into account the inter-
ests of a broader range of stakeholders in corporate decision making is 
that the quality of the decisions themselves will improve. To be sure, 
group decision making is thought to be a significant reason for the suc-
cess of corporations as a business form, in part because of a group’s abil-
ity to improve on the decision making of individuals by exposing and 
mitigating bias and mistake. These benefits, however, can vanish and, 
indeed, transform into costs if the group reinforces bias and submerges 
mistakes, worsening irrationalities. Group decision makers that are ho-
mogeneous in perspective, experience, and values fall easily into “group-
think”—a label attached to mistakes made by institutional decision mak-
ers when the presence of similarly thinking participants in a group results 
in biases being reinforced rather than challenged and mistakes validated 
rather than exposed.60 
Another example of group tendencies that worsen decision making 
is the inclination for discussion within groups comprised of individuals 
with similar world views and perspectives to harden those perspectives 
and views. In discussions about political issues, for example, groups on 
the extremes of political discourse become more extreme after discussion 
within the group.61 These implications are greater within groups that are 
homogeneous in perspective and in racial, gender, and class composition 
because “defective decision-making” is “strongly correlated” with struc-
tural flaws such as “insulation and homogeneity.”62 As Christine Jolls 
and Cass Sunstein have articulated, “erroneous judgments often result 
when deliberations are undertaken by like-minded people.”63 
The worry from a corporate governance perspective is that the qual-
ity of the decision making of the board is eroded when its homogeneity 
and insularity make it less likely that ideas will be properly vetted or that 
assumptions will be appropriately challenged. If a key element of the 
success of the corporation as a business form is the presence of a sophis-
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ticated group decision maker at the top of the business structure, this 
success is put at risk when the board suffers from structural or forma-
tional defects that weaken the decisional process or skew the results. One 
thing we know about group decision making is that dissent is essential, 
and that social bonds among people in the group can make disagreement 
less likely, exactly when disagreement is most needed to spur discussion 
and analysis. 
If the homogeneity of groups is a reason to worry about the quality 
of its decisions, then the current makeup of most boards is quite flawed. 
In fact, corporate boards may be the least diverse powerful institutions in 
the United States. Scholars increasingly point out the gender and racial 
homogeneity of boards and executive suites, and note the dangers posed 
to decision making by such narrowness.64 Yet the point is broader: A 
diversity of perspectives and an allowance of dissent and disagreement 
will allow for better decisions over time. A more pluralistic board may 
be more contentious at times but will more likely vet decisions much 
more thoroughly. In the words of Aaron Dhir, “[E]stablishing a level of 
‘cognitive diversity’ in the boardroom is . . . a key strategic asset which 
assists the firm in averting the perils and docile conduct associated with 
groupthink.”65 Indeed, the Blackstone executive cited above claimed that 
German codetermination mitigated the effects of the crash there and ar-
gued that the mechanism by which this worked was that it “introduces a 
range of new perspectives” at the board level.66 
C. The Long-Term over the Short-Term 
One of the few notes of agreement between business commentators 
and academics on both the right and the left is that “short-termism” is a 
problem.67 The problem is caused by the increasingly short time horizon 
of shareholders, who now hold their stocks, on average, for only a few 
months at a time. As much as 70% of the daily volume in the United 
States is high-frequency trading where investors hold stocks for sec-
onds.68 Thus, management adhering to the interests of those shareholders 
prioritize short-term gains even if the result is long-term difficulties. A 
survey of more than 400 chief financial officers of American compa-
nies—conducted before the 2008 collapse—revealed that a significant 
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majority of them would prioritize meeting Wall Street’s quarterly expec-
tations over doing what was best for the company in the longer term of 
even a few years down the road.69 The GFC revealed the risks of this 
prioritization of the short-term over the long-term. 
Including broader stakeholder concerns at the senior level of corpo-
rate decision making will help roll back the pervasive short-termism of 
corporations. Stakeholders in general, and employees and communities 
in particular, know their interests are not well served by prioritizing the 
short-term. They hope to have their jobs and their neighborhoods for 
more than a year; they are unwilling to assume away risk when they are 
the ones who would bear the costs if those risks play out. A more tech-
nical way of describing this is that there is less moral hazard with boards 
that include a diversity of interests. A less technical way of describing 
this is that people don’t play with fire when it’s their own house that will 
burn. 
IV. ANSWERING OBJECTIONS 
A variety of objections arise when discussing the idea of a more ro-
bust framework of managerial obligations and a more pluralistic corpo-
rate governance structure. I have answered a host of these objections 
elsewhere, but allow me to discuss two prominent ones here. 
A. The “Two Masters” Argument 
One worry about stakeholder governance is that a broadening of 
corporate responsibilities would actually make it easier for managers to 
avoid responsibility altogether. The argument goes something like this: If 
corporate managers have more than one “master” (that is, not just share-
holders), they can avoid real responsibility to any stakeholder by claim-
ing their actions are to further the interests of another stakeholder. Econ-
omists would call this an “agency costs” argument: enlarging the duties 
of management will increase the agency costs inherent in managing the 
firm because it will be more difficult to monitor whether the managers 
are in fact doing their jobs carefully and in good faith. 
This concern is inconsistent with another objection to stakeholder 
governance that one often hears, namely that corporate law need not wor-
ry about stakeholder interests because looking after shareholders will 
inevitably help other stakeholders as well. Of course, shareholder advo-
cates cannot have it both ways. If the interests of shareholders and other 
stakeholders are not in conflict, then agency costs will not increase much 
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if the law requires managers to take into account the interests of other 
stakeholders. 
A more accurate view is that there is indeed conflict between the in-
terests of shareholders and other stakeholders in a range of cases, espe-
cially in the short-term. Such conflict, however, is not a reason to fear 
that managers are unable to handle increased responsibility or that it 
would be impossible to know whether managers are doing their jobs 
well. It is true, in a mundane way, that someone who has two responsibil-
ities may have more difficulty meeting both than she would if she had 
only one. Nonetheless, people routinely have more than one responsibil-
ity, some of them even conflicting. Humans are quite accustomed to hav-
ing a range of obligations. 
Many business managers are asked to balance a multitude of obli-
gations, some arising from corporate law, some from other areas of law, 
and some from the market. For example, corporations regularly issue 
different classes of stock that afford different rights, but directors still 
owe fiduciary duties to holders of all classes of stock even when the in-
terests of the various classes are in conflict. It is not impossible for courts 
to analyze whether the managers satisfied their fiduciary duties to be 
careful, act in good faith, and not act in their own self-interest. 
The only way in which having more and broader responsibilities 
would make it easier for managers to avoid responsibility is that it would 
allow them to use one obligation as a defense to a claim that they failed 
to satisfy another. This, however, is not a function of the number and 
scope of responsibilities; rather, it is a function of how they are enforced, 
and corporate law duties are simply not enforced in a way that would 
allow managers to play one duty off the other. 
Consider the duty of care. When courts enforce that duty, they re-
duce it essentially to a procedural obligation, namely to investigate vari-
ous alternatives, consider various possible outcomes, take the time nec-
essary to deliberate effectively, and erect certain monitoring systems to 
ensure the smooth flow of information from throughout the company to 
the centralized management.70 If managers were required to take account 
                                                 
 70. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 891 (Del. 1985) (finding that director-defendants 
breached the duty of care because of their failure to inform themselves of all information reasonably 
available to them and relevant to their decision and by their failure to disclose all material infor-
mation to the stockholders); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 
1996) (finding that director-defendants upheld the duty of care by meeting and being informed by 
experts on the relevant issues and having monitoring information systems in place); Francis v. Unit-
ed Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 821 (N.J. 1981) (finding that director-defendant had breached the 
duty of care by nonfeasance because a director has a duty to act, including acquiring “at least a ru-
dimentary understanding of the business of the corporation”). 
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of, for example, employees’ interests, the duty of care would be enforced 
in the same way it is now. No manager would be able to erect a defense 
to a shareholder claim by saying she was unable to pay attention to the 
impact of the decision on shareholders because at the time she was think-
ing about employees. The managers would have to do both. Yes, this 
may be more difficult, but it is not impossible, and it is certainly not the 
kind of difficulty that throws up such dust that one cannot discern if the 
management is doing their jobs. 
Similarly, the duty of loyalty would not be loosened if managers 
were required to look after non-equity investors. In corporate law, loyalty 
requires managers not to engage in self-dealing. Such an obligation 
would not be undermined by including employees among the beneficiar-
ies of managers’ fiduciary duties. Rather, adding to the number of people 
who benefit from managers’ fiduciary duties will make it less likely that 
managers will be able to get away with self-dealing. More corporate 
stakeholders will have an interest in monitoring managerial conflict of 
interest. 
Beneath the surface of the agency-cost argument, the mainstream 
theorists worry that adding to the responsibilities of management will 
make it less likely that management will act like agents of the sharehold-
ers. Managers may indeed change their behavior in that way, but assert-
ing that such a change is a problem simply begs the question of whether 
managers should serve only the interests of the shareholders. 
Moreover, the existence of shareholder agency costs is not itself a 
persuasive argument because other stakeholders also have agency costs. 
Other stakeholders make important contributions to the firm, and all 
stakeholders depend on management to use those contributions to create 
wealth. All stakeholders depend on managers and therefore have an in-
centive to monitor them. A shareholder primacy rule makes it more diffi-
cult for these other stakeholders to rely on management, which raises the 
stakeholders’ agency costs. A relaxation of the shareholder primacy 
model might increase the agency costs of shareholders, but it will de-
crease the agency costs of non-shareholder stakeholders, which are just 
as important as shareholders’ agency costs. 
To say that only shareholders should have a rule that lowers their 
agency costs assumes shareholder primacy. Nonetheless, we cannot justi-
fy the rule of shareholder primacy by pointing to shareholder agency 
costs unless the agency costs of other stakeholders are discounted. Those 
costs can only be discounted if shareholders are supreme. 
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B. Competitiveness 
Another objection to a stakeholder model is that such a brand of 
corporate governance might kill the golden goose of American competi-
tiveness. Forcing corporate managers to take into account the interests of 
employees and other stakeholders will deaden companies’ ability to 
make tough allocation decisions, produce products at a low price, and 
succeed over time. 
This worry is overblown. No stakeholder in the firm benefits when 
a company fails, and no one is hurt more from the failure of a publicly-
traded company than its employees. Shareholders, on the other hand, typ-
ically hold a diversified portfolio of stocks, and the failure of one firm or 
another is not usually debilitating to a shareholder’s overall financial sit-
uation. 
In fact, a focus on shareholders will mean that companies will be 
more, not less, likely to fail. Because of their diversified portfolios and 
the fact that they enjoy the protection of limited liability, shareholders 
actually tend to prefer that companies whose stock they hold make risky 
decisions that create an above-average return for their entire portfolio, 
but that risks bankruptcy for individual firms. Shareholders do not care 
much whether any given firm fails, as long as their portfolio as a whole 
maximizes their expected returns. 
Employees, on the other hand, are not diversified in their labor in-
vestment—they typically work for one employer at a time and may have 
invested much time and effort to develop firm-specific human capital. 
They are not risk neutral but, as to their employment, risk averse. Rather 
than being indifferent as to the risk of failure for the company for which 
they work, employees care deeply about their firm’s financial health be-
cause they stand to lose a great deal if their firm suffers. 
What this means is that a company required to take into account 
employee interests will fail less often than a shareholder-dominated firm. 
Because shareholders are relatively indifferent as to the possibility of any 
single firm failing, managers who make decisions according to what is 
good for the shareholders will bring about the failure of their companies 
more often than managers who make decisions based on what is good for 
a broader mix of stakeholders. 
There is nothing incompatible with employee and stakeholder in-
volvement in management and business success. As discussed above, as 
employees feel more “ownership” in their firm, they will work harder, 
contribute more ideas, improve their productivity, malinger less, and 
obey company rules more. This will tend to improve company profitabil-
ity over time. 
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The more difficult competitiveness critique to answer is not that in-
dividual firms will fail if they take into account the interests of stake-
holders, but that capital (i.e., shareholders) will flee U.S. markets if a 
stakeholder governance framework is established. That is, if corporations 
are required to take into account the interests of non-equity investors, 
then equity investors will take their capital elsewhere. 
It is true that recognizing a stakeholder framework might bring 
about a reallocation of the corporate surplus away from shareholders and 
toward other stakeholders. That is part of the objective of such a frame-
work. As the stakeholder model creates gains for the corporation as a 
whole, the slice of the pie going to shareholders may grow in an absolute 
sense, even if it is not as large in a comparative sense. 
The judgment of capital is always a relative one—“will I make 
more if I invest here or elsewhere?”—so a stakeholder corporate govern-
ance regime will only cause capital to flee if it can find a better 
risk/return mix elsewhere. Given the power and stability of U.S. markets, 
there are very few places likely to offer a better risk/return ratio. Eu-
rope’s current corporate governance framework is more protective of 
stakeholders than any regime the United States is likely to enact, making 
it unlikely that capital will flee to Europe. Indeed, the fact that Europe 
has such a robust system of stakeholder protection while maintaining 
healthy and competitive capital markets is an indication that there is little 
reason to worry that capital will abandon ship if the United States adopts 
a similar model. 
Of course, an argument that capital will punish efforts to impose a 
stakeholder governance regime is analogous to an objection to any regu-
latory effort that imposes costs on capital, whether it be a minimum 
wage, additional environmental protection, or ban on child labor. In 
those settings, a range of factors determines regulatory choices, including 
whether the regulatory effort will be worth the various costs that might 
arise. In some cases, a public policy initiative—limiting carbon emis-
sions from factories—would impose costs on capital, and those costs 
might have an effect on whether capital will flow to U.S. securities mar-
kets or markets overseas. But an analysis of the costs must include a look 
at the potential benefits as well (e.g., a lessening of the rate of climate 
change), and it would be unwise simply to succumb to the pressures from 
those who threaten to take their capital and go home. 
The same should be true with regard to stakeholder governance. 
The question is not simply whether there might be some short-term costs 
to capital, but whether benefits can be gained from the initiative that 
would balance out those costs. There is reason to be optimistic that they 
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would because these benefits are of the kind that will build on them-
selves. 
V. CONCLUSION 
To take advantage of the historical moment of intellectual churning 
in which we find ourselves, corporate law theorists will need to break out 
of the traditional paradigm of shareholder power versus managerial pre-
rogative. A third way, linking broader managerial obligations with a 
more pluralistic governance structure, merits the attention of the corpo-
rate law academy. Such a framework will protect against the worst risks 
of corporate power and will provide benefits that will multiply over time. 
 
 
